Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts

Monday, March 6, 2017

The Battle for Rama - 1. Babur's Mosques

In her 2013 book, "Rama and Ayodhya", Meenakshi Jain had presented perhaps the most accessible, authoritative, and comprehensive account of the  literary, sculptural, epigraphic, and historical evidence to support the antiquity and ubiquity of Rama across India, in addition to summarizing the findings of the Allahabad High Court's verdict on the case.

Her 2017 book, "The Battle for Rama: Case of the Temple at Ayodhya", builds upon "Rama and Ayodhya" with new information and evidence that has come to light in the last few years. While it is a short book, at 160 pages, it is nonetheless lavishly produced, with 61 illustrations and full-colour photographs printed on glossy paper. 

Thursday, August 11, 2016

Dalits, Muslims, Gurkhas, Chambal, and more. Growth of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India - KS Lal

T
he myth of Dalit-Islam unity has been doing the rounds for a few decades now, despite a copious amount of evidence to the contrary and a near-complete absence of historical evidence to support the premise of any such unity. The primary causal factors for the persistence of this myth are poor scholarship among modern historians (which in turn can be blamed on the cabal of leftist historians who have a vice-like control on almost all institutions of historical research in India), the resurgence of radical ideologies that seek to warp facts to force-fit their worldview, and above all a general apathy towards the study of history in India. Dalits have found themselves at the receiving end of communal violence at the hands of Muslims in riots - whether it was the horrendous violence during Partition, or the equally horrific riots following the burning of 59 Hindu men, women, and children in a train near Godhra in Gujarat in 2002. Yet the myth of "Dalit-Muslim unity" lives on. To then say that the credit for the growth of India's tribal population (sometimes also referred to as Dalits) goes to the centuries-long Muslim rule in India between 712-1707 CE would be a surprise to most. Yet it is the proposition made and proven by distinguished historian, K.S. Lal, in his book, "Growth of Scheduled Tribes and Castes in Medieval India."

Sunday, May 29, 2016

Rama and Ayodhya, by Meenakshi Jain

Rama and Ayodhya, by Meenakshi Jain
Aryan Books International; 2013 edition
(ISBN: 8173054517, 978-8173054518)

Rama and Ayodhya, by Meenakshi Jain

An indispensable, though brief, compendium to understand the past and present of Ayodhya.

The diffusion of propaganda requires repetition. In the words of someone many leftists have secretly admired for long, repetition is what makes propaganda successful (the full quote is (bold-emphasis mine), "The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly and with unflagging attention. It must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over".

This was a strategy used to brilliant success by militant Islamists, communist historians, and Indologists of dubious integrity in the west during the Ayodhya movement in the 1980s and 90s.

Diana Eck is a faculty member of The Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Islamic Studies Program at Harvard University (which was established as a result of a $20 million grant by the Saudi prince, Alwaleed Bin Talal). In her 2012 book, "India: A Sacred Geography" (my review), she had very bluntly and pointedly argued against the evidence of a temple at the disputed site, citing "Indian historians and archaeologists, both Hindu and Muslim." The sole archaeologist she cited in her section on Ayodhya had this to say in her book - "There is not a single piece of evidence for the existence of a temple of brick, stone, or both." For reasons that should become clear very soon, Diana Eck chose to bury the archaeologist's name in the references section of her book. That archaeologist's name is D. Mandal, from the University of Allahabad.

Friday, January 29, 2016

Heretic, by Ayaan Hirsi Ali - Review


Heretic - Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now
by Ayaan Hirsi Ali
(@Ayaan)

Good start, but runs out of steam early on, and gallops mostly on hot air after that.

That Islam needs a reformation, and urgently, is not in debate, for most. The unfolding tragedy of the civil war Syria, where an estimated forty per cent of its population (yes, two of every five people) has been displaced as a result of the largely Shia-Sunni conflict is just one example. Islam is often said to be in the same state as where Christianity was a few hundred years ago. "Reformation" helped bring in a gradual moderation of the more violent and extremist facets of Christianity - especially the Church. While the zealous streak of "soul-harvesting" and proselytization by missionaries still threatens serious unrest wherever it rears its ugly head, it is nonetheless an undeniable fact that Christianity of the twenty-first century looks little like the Christianity of the medieval ages. Ali calls for a similar "reformation" in Islam. This book however does not succeed in making a cogent case for such a reformation, nor does it get down to specifics in any coherent way that could provide a basis for serious discussion - beyond what can be found by a quick reading of Wikipedia or even Twitter. What little usefulness the book offered is however drowned out by an uncritical adulation of everything western and a blind faith in western social mores as a panacea to all ills of the Muslim world. This book is perhaps targeted at the western reader who is looking for comforting validation of existing stereotypes about the Arab and Muslim world - it may provide a comforting cocoon, but will not shed light on the vexing issue that is in crying need of serious debate.

Long review:

Ayaan Hirsi Ali's rise from a Somalian refugee escaping a forced marriage, to seeking asylum in the Netherlands, to becoming an elected member of the Dutch parliament, to her landing at the Harvard Kennedy School, and becoming a target for jihadis and the recipient of endless death threats, evokes admiration for the single-minded courage that she has shown in the face of such unremitting intimidation from fundamentalists over the years.

Monday, December 1, 2014

Shani Shingnapur, Maharashtra



Truth be told, I do not have many photographs of the Shani Shingnapur Temple in Maharashtra. This is because they do not allow photographs inside the temple, and I was too enthralled by the entire experience to remember to take my camera out. The temple town is about 35kms from Ahmednagar - so it can be done as a quick detour if you're on your way to Aurangabad - and about 70kms from Shirdi. Shirdi is, of course, famous for Sai Baba, and going to Shingnapur and back from Shirdi can be done in about four hours. The road is OK for the most part, except for about a 15 km stretch that is not so OK.

However, this was a somewhat striking moment outside the temple, in the parking lot. Apart from the shops that hawk every knick-knack you could want for instant moksha and to protect you from the evil eye of anyone envious of your prosperity - which could be almost everyone and anyone - there was this loads of color (gulal, kumkum, call it what you will) on a cart that was being tended to by this elderly gentleman. Nothing out of the ordinary till you realize the gentleman is a Muslim. While trite and overused to death cliches do come to mind, it is a measure of India's enduring spirit of inclusiveness that binds people together. Commerce of course is a highly underestimated glue.


© 2014, Abhinav Agarwal (अभिनव अग्रवाल). All rights reserved.

Friday, August 9, 2013

Land of the Seven Rivers, by Sanjeev Sanyal

Land of the Seven Rivers: A Brief History of India's Geography, by Sanjeev Sanyal

One line review: Five millennia, one history, one nation, one helluva book.

Short review: This book is a second, much grander and a much better attempt by the author to answer one question. This time around though, he goes deeper and farther back in the history of the land of seven rivers - India, presents us with his findings, and posits that India has had a sense of history - one that not only goes back several unbroken thousand years, but has found echo in successive empires and invaders seeking to associate themselves with this history. As the author travels through the country - in time as well as geography - we are treated to some long-forgotten incidents that should have been part of our curricula, as well as fascinating insights into such endeavours as the mapping of the country by the colonials, which itself was a source of competitive advantage in a manner of speaking. The second question, which the author attempted to answer in his first book, but with less than middling success, is why India went into decline a thousand years ago. The answer, my friend, is blowin in the wind, and you need to turn the pages to find it. The truth is out there in the hardcover. A must read. Makes it to my best books I have read in 2013 (see this and this for a review of the notable books I read in 2012).

Long review:

Sunday, June 16, 2013

Tinderbox, by MJ Akbar


Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan, by M.J. Akbar

"One good section, two okay parts, and several instances of selective interpretations."

4 stars
(Flipkart, Flipkart ebookAmazon US / CA / UKKindle US / UKCAPowell's)

One-line review: Two books, three parts, and some parts confusion and obfuscation.

Sunday, September 9, 2012

Londonistan, By Melanie Phillips - Review

Londonistan, By Melanie Phillips

"Right-Wing Leanings Aside, Some Serious Questions."
 
Review in short: The author casts a critical eye on the direction British society and the nation have taken that seem to have resulted in a radicalization of the Islamic community in the country. Substantial documentation of the foibles of the British polity, intellectuals, judiciary adds heft to the message. An important and trenchant, if somewhat disturbing and critique. Many of the questions and context are eerily applicable in the Indian context too.

Longer Review.
As Britain becomes more multi-cultural and more heterogeneous a society, it has also had to face a most unfortunate consequence of this intermingling. People - immigrants - who have turned against their motherland. The London terrorist attacks of 2005 brought this problem to the forefront for much of Britain - "The realization that British boys would want to murder their fellow citizens was bad enough." What some have perceived as a lax and permissive attitude among the intelligentsia to the sprouting of Islamic fundamentalism has led to the coinage of a pejoration: "Londinistan" - "a mocking play on the names of such state sponsors of terrorism as Afghanistan", and the despair that London itself has become "the major European center for the promotion, recruitment and financing of Islamic terror and extremism." This book, then, is a scathing look at the players that have led to, in the author’s view, a surrender to the forces of Islamic fundamentalism in Britain.

In the author’s view, and backed by considerable data, such a pejoration - the term ‘Londonistan’ - may not be without merit, especially if one considers the vast numbers of Britons engaged in nefarious activities. "According to British officials, up to sixteen thousand British Muslims either are actively engaged in or support terrorist activity, while up to three thousand are estimated to have passed through al-Qaeda training camps, with several hundred thought to be primed to attack the United Kingdom."

The author has tackled different aspects of this issue in a separate chapter each. Therefore, in chapter two, for instance, she takes on the lax immigration system for the uncontrolled influx of people claiming persecution in their home countries, so much so that "many Islamist terrorists and extremists found Britain to be such a delightful and agreeable destination." She harshly condemns "Ministers and officials in charge of the asylum system" as being "among the least likely to possess either the intellectual or the political clout to tackle the problem". She also pillories the European Court of Human Rights for extending "the scope of the provision in the European Convention on Human Rights that prohibits torture or degrading treatment" as it became "impossible to deport illegal immigrants - including suspected terrorists - to any place where the judges thought such abuses might be practiced." Worse was the British judiciary, while "independent of political control", came to "see themselves, rather than the democratically elected politicians, as the true guardians of the country’s values."

To take a more detailed look at some of the arguments put forth in the book, let us start with the evidence that points to a radicalization of Muslims in the UK itself. To that end there is an impressive array of facts the author marshals to argue the point that, to begin with, UK has played host to terrorists and organizations with terror-links, unequivocally.
"UK-based terrorists have carried out operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kenya, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, Morocco, Russia, Spain and the United States."
"And the number of terrorists who have come roaring out of these polluted British waters is startling. UK-based terrorists have carried out operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kenya, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, Morocco, Russia, Spain and the United States. The roll call includes Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, killer of the journalist Daniel Pearl and disaffected, brilliant son of Pakistani immigrants; Dhiren Barot, Nadeem Tarmohammed and Qaisar Shaffi, British citizens and al-Qaeda members who plotted to attack major financial centers in the United States; Mohammad Bilal from Birmingham, who drove a truck loaded with explosives into a police barracks in Kashmir; the "shoe-bomber" Richard Reid, who was converted to Islam at Brixton Mosque in south London; Sajid Badat from Gloucester, a putative second shoe-bomber but who was also caught and is now in jail; and Omar Khan Sharif and Asif Mohammed Hanif, the British boys who helped bomb a Tel Aviv bar in 2003 and killed three Israeli civilians. And let’s not forget Azahari Husin or the "Demolition Man," the Malaysian engineer who belonged to the al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI). He had studied at Reading University in the 1980s, honed his bomb-making skills in Afghanistan in the 1990s, helped mastermind the terrorist attacks in Bali (twice) and finally blew himself up in a gun battle with Indonesian police in November 2005."

"One of the world’s most radical Islamist organizations, Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is banned in many countries where it is considered a major threat, has its headquarters in Britain."
"Scarcely less significant is the European headquarters of the radical proselytizing movement Tablighi Jamaat at Dewsbury in Yorkshire."

"Al-Sunnah, the Islamist magazine that calls repeatedly for human-bomb terror operations against the United States, is published from London,"

"Indeed, one could say that it was in Britain that al-Qaeda was actually formed as a movement."
"Many of Osama bin Laden’s fatwas were first published in London."

"The foiled millennium plots of 1999 and 2000, when al-Qaeda planned a series of attacks in Europe, the United States and the Middle East, all led back to London."
You know things were bad when Egypt "denounced Britain as a hotbed for radicals" after "Abu Hamza welcomed the massacre of fifty-eight European tourists at Luxor in October 1997".  Abu Hamza was "an Egyptian-born former engineering student and nightclub bouncer, who had lost an eye and an arm in Afghanistan and sported a hook instead of a hand", and was allowed to live and preach in Britain for several years, till he was finally jailed in "February 2006 for soliciting murder and inciting racial hatred"

It is useful to describe the term Islamism itself as it is used extensively in the book. "Islamism is the term given to the extreme form of politicized Islam that has become dominant in much of the Muslim world and is the ideological source of global Islamic terrorism." The author states "It derives from a number of radical organizations", prominent among them being the Tablighi Jamaat in India/Pakistan, the Muslim Brotherhood ("which was founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna with Sayed Qutb its leading ideologue. Its creed is known as Salafism and is deeply antisemitic; this is virtually indistinguishable from Saudi Arabian Wahhabism"), and "the Jamaat al-Islami, founded by Sayed Abu’l Ala Maududi in India/Pakistan"

So how did such a radicalization came to happen? And why wasn't anything done about it? Were the Muslims residing in Britain, all 1.6 million out of a population of 60 million, siding with the terrorists? Were they sympathizing with these Islamists? No, not quite, argues the author, and there is nuance to the "no".

"In Britain, hundreds of thousands of Muslims lead law-abiding lives" However, and this is where the nuance appears, in the author’s opinion, the majority of the pacifists need to be more vocal about their abhorrence for Islamist violence, and more disturbingly, moderation among them is relative, "considering their widespread hostility towards Israel and the Jews, for example, or the way in which the very concept of Islamic terrorism or other wrongdoing is automatically denied."

More disturbingly, for Britain, there has also been this barely hidden desire within the British Islamic community to see more Islamization in society in general. Consider this:
"A poll conducted by the Guardian newspaper found that 61 percent of British Muslims wanted to be governed by Islamic law, operating on Sharia principles - "so long as the penalties did not contravene British law." A clear majority wanted Islamic law introduced into Britain in civil cases relating to their own community. In addition, 88 percent wanted to see British schools and workplaces accommodating Muslim prayer times as part of their normal working day."
This is perhaps by no means unsurprising - if a community wants more elements of its traditional jurisprudence to be integrated into their adopted country. Perhaps. But what about taking offence at the slightest pretext? What about self-censorship because of fear of causing offence to the easily-offended by vocal minority among Muslims?
"Novelty pig calendars and toys were banned from a council office in case they offended Muslim staff. Ice creams were withdrawn from the Burger King chain after complaints from Muslims that a whorl design on the lid looked like the word "Allah." Various councils banned the concept of Christmas, on the grounds that it was "too Christian" and therefore "offensive" to peoples of other faiths"
Or
"There are now more than 140 housing associations in England catering to ethnic minorities; one of them, the Aashyana in Bristol, provides special apartments for Muslims with the toilets facing away from Mecca."
So, why not debate this issue? After all, these are fairly existential questions for British society, one would assume. But here one has to tread carefully. It is easy for such debates to get hijacked by extremists on both sides, and for stereotype-driven accusations to fly fast and furious.
 "One of the reasons why people shy away from acknowledging the religious aspect of this problem is, first, the very proper respect that should be afforded to people’s beliefs and, second, the equally proper fear of demonizing an entire community. There is indeed a risk of such a discussion exposing innocent Muslims to attack."
If the majority of Muslims in Britain do not agree with or subscribe to the extremist views of those within their community, then they need to be more vocal about it. Which they are not. "If "moderation" includes reasonableness, truthfulness and fairness, the reaction by British Muslims to the London bombings was not moderate at all. Yes, they condemned the atrocities. But in the next breath they denied that these had had anything to do with Islam. Thus they not only washed their hands of (sic) any communal responsibility but - in denying what was a patently obvious truth that these attacks were carried out by adherents of Islam in the name of Islam - also indicated that they would do nothing to address the roots of the problem so as to prevent such a thing from happening again."

It is not as if there is no one speaking out against the Islamists from within the Muslim community. The most eloquent case for the Muslim community to speak against terrorism perhaps comes from Mansoor Ijaz, who wrote in the Financial Times, "It is hypocritical for Muslims living in western societies to demand civil rights enshrined by the state and then excuse their inaction against terrorists hiding among them on grounds of belonging to a borderless Islamic community. It is time to stand up and be counted as model citizens before the terror consumes us all."

Dissenting voices are often either silenced or threatened into submission. "Reda Hussaine is an Algerian journalist who started inquiring into Algerian radicals in London after his Paris office, where he was trying to start up an independent Algerian newspaper, was ransacked in 1993. The French police told him that the attack had been organized from London, that the group responsible was sending money to terrorists in Algeria, and that Abu Qatada was behind it."

What about representatives of the Muslims in Britain? You know you may have a problem of sorts when Sir Iqbal Sacranie, secretary-general of the Muslim Council of Britain, "regarded by the British establishment as the most reliable mainstream voice of the Muslim community", compares "Hamas suicide bombers to Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Ghandi (sic)."

Or take the words of Tariq Ramadan, who, according to "researcher Caroline Fourest", "speaks with two voices". When "asked whether he approved of the killing of an eight-year-old Israeli child who would grow up to be a soldier, he replied: ‘That act in itself is morally condemnable but contextually explicable,'"

A piece in the middle of the book is very illuminating in shedding some light on the topic of Islamopobia. She quotes Kenan Malik, ""antiracist" Asian writer", who suggests that "Islamophobia is a myth and is being exaggerated to suit politicians' needs and silence the critics of Islam: The more the threat of Islamophobia is exaggerated, the more ordinary Muslims believe that they are under constant attack. It helps create a siege mentality, it stokes up anger and resentment, and it makes Muslims more inward looking and more open to religious extremism. It also creates a climate of censorship in which any criticism of Islam can be dismissed as Islamophobic. The people who suffer most from such censorship are those struggling to defend basic rights within Muslim communities"

Islamic theologians are not to be left behind in strengthening the needle of suspicion that some harbor against Islam.
"In 1980, the Islamic Council of Europe published a book called Muslim Communities in Non-Muslim States, which explained the Islamic Agenda in Europe. When Muslims lived as a minority, it said, they faced theological problems, because classical Islamic teaching always presupposed a context of Islamic dominance. The book told Muslims to organize themselves with the aim of establishing a viable Muslim community, to set up mosques, community centers and Islamic schools. The ultimate goal of this strategy was that the Muslims should become a majority and the entire nation be governed according to Islam." 
This is a deliberately and dangerously confrontationalist approach to take, and its effects can be seen even in the beliefs slowly gaining ground among Muslims in Britain.

In all this, it would be awfully remiss to not take a look at politicians and politics. It is a universally acknowledged truth that an amoral politician in need of electoral safety will seek refuge in divisions in society. This has been true with Indian politicians for over half a century, and it should be of no surprise to people that Britain is no different.
"Labour was traditionally the party that appealed most to new immigrants, and Britain’s Muslims were no exception. Many Labour MPs, including the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, found themselves representing constituencies with significant Muslim populations. This had a number of consequences, one of which was that some Labour politicians allowed Pakistani politics to influence British politics." And thus you come across the concept of "vote-banks" in Britain. " 
On the day of the 2005 British general election, Faisal Bodi wrote in the Guardian: "Labour politicians have cultivated the "community leader", the modern-day equivalent of the village chief, whose unique selling point is that he can bring in the vote of the particular ethnic sub-category he belongs to, be it by fair means or rigged postal votes." This seeking of votes goes beyond the shores of the island nation. "According to the bishop of Rochester, Dr. Michael Nazir-Ali, himself of Pakistani origin, a number of Labour MPs with large numbers of Muslim voters need the support of various Islamic leaders in Pakistan who tell their followers in Britain how to vote."

It is a reasonable expectation that the media engender debate on topics that are of interest and of importance to society. In the author’s opinion, when it comes to discussing Islamism in Britain, the media has practiced self-censorship at best, if not outright intellectual dishonesty. Two incidents cited are the murder of "Theo van Gogh, the Dutch filmmaker who was killed for questioning Islamic attitudes to women", or the protests "over the publication in Denmark of a batch of cartoons linking the Prophet Mohammed with violence".

If Muslims, even those born and raised in Britain, were to take up terrorism, surely the fault could not be all lain at the door of either Islam, or radical Islam, or the Muslim community. That is only a very reasonable position to take. The author is also on board with this position. So the fault must be shared with Britain also, right? Yes, sort of. The author seizes upon the ‘liberal’ ethos and casts an accusatory finger upon it. Things get wider in scope from here. But let’s look at the author’s articulation. The author believes that the process of radicalizing started more than three decades ago, in the 1970s, when Muslim immigrants arrived in large numbers from "Pakistan, Bangladesh and India" to "work in the cotton mills in England’s northern industrial towns such as Bradford and Burnley, Oldham and Rotherham." These immigrants' faith was "largely influenced by introspective, gentle Sufism and was thus passive and quiescent." But all that changed in "in the space of a few years" and "it became an increasingly activist faith centered on the mosques, which were transmitting a highly radicalized ideology."  "Such young men, stranded between the mores of Mirpur village life on the one hand and the degraded nihilism of British "liberal" society on the other, are thus easy prey for the puppet-masters of terror."

Ok, if she says so. And then there is a roadhouse punch at Islamic society itself:
"What makes these fragile egos yet more vulnerable still, moreover, is the pathological inferiority complex that afflicts Muslim society, the exaggerated notions of shame and honor which mean that every slight turns into a major grievance, disadvantage morphs into paranoia, and Islam itself is perceived to be under siege everywhere."
One gets the impression that she really wanted to take a sledgehammer at all of Asian Third World, but perhaps thought it more politically correct, in a manner of speaking, to direct this broadside against Muslim society, obligatory refrains of avoiding stereotyping notwithstanding.

So why are liberals to blame for this? Well, if I understand the line of thinking taken by the author, and this is a simplification, it is because liberals hate capitalism and capitalists. The United States is the embodiment of capitalism. Preconceived notions and stereotypes of Jews mean that Jews are associated with capitalism. Hence the liberal hatred of Jews. Fundamental Christians have, on their part, believed, and have been taught, that Jews murdered Jesus. Hence Jews are evil, and hence Jews need to be eliminated. There is an actual theological doctrine that exists to justify this. Known as ""replacement theology," or "supercessionism,", it goes like this: "going back to the early Church Fathers and stating that all God’s promises to the Jews - including the land of Israel - were forfeit because the Jews had denied the divinity of Christ. This doctrine lay behind centuries of Christian anti-Jewish hatred until the Holocaust drove it underground." Islamists, on their part, have bought into the wholesale portrayal of of Jews as evil - "Drawing on a theological animosity, it is based on the belief that the Jews are a Satanic force and a conspiracy to destroy Islam and rule the world; and that, since the Jews control Western society, it follows that Israel is the forward flank of the West's attempt to subjugate Muslims everywhere ... Fixating upon the early conflict between the Prophet Mohammed and the Jewish tribes of seventh-century Arabia, the Islamists became obsessed with the archetype of a universal Jew, treacherous by nature, whose perfidy threatened not only Islam but all humanity."

The enemy of my enemy is my friend, and hence the liberal’s chumminess with Islamists. One can see strong traces of this line of thinking on the part of liberals also manifest itself in India, where there is a strong aversion to criticism of Islamic terrorism, or to ask searching questions of Islamists in India who covertly or overtly broadcast messages of hate against non-believers.

Conclusion:
The book has what I would call a definite right-wing, nationalist, Christian conservative slant.  The author herself does not shy away from it. She argues that these are in fact required for the maintenance of peace in British society. If, however, it was just that, the book could have been easily dismissed. However, what elevates the book from the ranks of a xenophobic screed is the fact that it is well-researched, disturbing, and thought-provoking. Yes, there is a selective cherry-picking of facts and a selective interpretation too, but even taking both into account, this book still raises several questions about the direction the nation of Britain is taking, the culpability of its politicians, and whether its Muslim clergy and intellectuals wants their community to be held hostage to the philosophy of its fringe fundamentalists.

The  other issue that people may find with the book is its sweeping pronouncements heralding the end of Britain and of Western society in general. Consider this, "What if, instead of holding the line for Western culture against the Islamic jihad, Britain is sleepwalking into the arms of the enemy?" Or "In the United States, at least there are wars over culture; in Britain, there has been a rout."

In some cases the flowery prose is outright bizarre. Like where she writes, "helping sow the dragon’s teeth from which would spring the killers". I stopped counting how many metaphors had been mixed and mangled.

For Indians this book should hold an added element of interest. The reason should not be difficult to find. Terrorism, especially terrorism inflicted in the name of and by radical Islamists, has been borne by India for over twenty years. Many of the topics that the book dwells upon are equally germane in India too. Any and all attempts to debate the theological basis for such radicalism are quickly shouted down by equally radicalized voices.

Lastly, it is somewhat ironic that Britain today stands at the junction of trying to assimilate heterogeneous cultures, religions, and identities, while still providing enough space for these identities to preserve their uniqueness. It is after all Britain that pursued a considered policy of racial and religious divisiveness in the Indian subcontinent for two centuries. Whether it was to make caste the sole differentiating factor among Hindus, or using a manufactured Aryan Invasion theory to divide North and South Indians, or pitting Hindus vs. Muslims, it was all part of what Lord Elphinstone called a "divide et impera" policy. One is tempted, almost, to use the phrase that the chickens have come home to roost, or the other phrase that stings even more - "as you sow, so shall you reap".

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Londonistan_(term)
www.melaniephillips.com/londonistan


Sunday, September 2, 2012

After the Prophet, Part 4

Deeply Sympathetic, Gripping Page-Turner. Though At Times Overly Melodramatic Narrative.
(KindleAmazonFlipkart, my review on Amazon)
5 stars

Part 4 - The End of Ali, and the Beginning of the Split.  (See Part 1, Part 2, Part 3)

Thus outmaneuvered, as Ali's army began the march back to Kufa, the murmurs of disappointment began to arise. Rather than confront their own gullibility, some turned an accusatory finger at Ali. The leader of the disgruntled was Abdullah ibn Wahb, and they were to be the "first Islmaic fundamentalists". The name Abdullah ibn Wahb "still reverberates in the Islamic world since it calls to mind Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the fundamentalist Wahhabi sect." Wahb and his followers accused Ali of sinning by entering into an agreement with Muawiya. Yet it was Ali's followers who had forced him into negotiations. Wahb would hear none of it, and argued that he had repented, and so was clear of sin. Ali would have to do the same. Wahb, and some three thousand of his followers, left and,  "Fifty miles north of Kufa they established a new settlement on the Tigris at Nahrawan. It was to be a haven of purity"

These self-proclaimed purists, fundamentalists, "began to terrorize the countryside around Nahrawan, submitting everyone they caught to a kind of mini Inquisition. If the answers failed to satisfy their rigid standards, the punishment was death. Matters came to a head when they chose the farmer son of an early companion of Muhammad’s as their victim." The gory end that the farmer and his wife and their unborn son met is too barbaric to imagine, but it is nonetheless instructional to reproduce it here:
"They made the farmer kneel and watch as they disemboweled his wife, cut out the unborn infant, and ran it through with a sword. Then they cut off the farmer’s head."
Wahb's reply to Ali's demand that they surrender the killers was typical. "All of us are their killers. And all of us say: Your blood, Ali, is now halal - permitted - for us."
Note here that for these fundamentalists, not even the Prophet's son-in-law and adopted son meant anything. Theirs was an implacable fury. You could transport these words into the twentieth century, the twenty-first century, and you will find any number of radicals spouting the same rubbish, with the same zeal and deluded self-belief.

And so Ali led a Muslim army against Muslims at Nahrawan, and less than four hundred of the "Rejectionists" survived.

Meanwhile, things went from bad to worse for Ali. Muawaiya's chief of staff, Amr, represented him at the arbitrations with Ali, who was represented by the ageing and simple Abu Musa. Those arbitrations ended in disaster, with Muawiya proclaiming himself as a second Caliph. Things got even worse when, in response to an imminent invasion of Egypt by Amr, Ali sent one of his "most experienced generals" to help shore up Egypt's defenses. The general was welcomed by the chief customs officer, who offered Ali's general "the customary honeyed drink in welcome." The drink was laced with poison, and the general was dead within hours. Egypt fell soon thereafter. Muhammad Abu Bakr, Aisha's half-brother and Ali's stepson, was hunted down and killed.
"...the Syrian soldiers carried out their revenge for Othman on the man who had led his assassins. Ignoring orders to take Abu Bakr alive, they sewed him into the rotting carcass of a donkey, then set it on fire. Some accounts have it that he was already dead by then; others, that he was still alive and burned to death."
If the brother was a demon, the sister was no less sadistic. "Muawiya’s sister Umm Habiba", sent Aisha a "'condolence gift' of a freshly roasted leg of lamb, dripping with bloody juices. The accompanying message read: 'So was your brother cooked.'"

Ali's end also came soon after - "at dawn on Friday, January 26, in the year 661, midway through the monthlong fast of Ramadan. Ali had walked to the mosque in Kufa for the first prayer of the day" A Rejectionist, hiding, fell upon Ali, and opened a large wound on his head with a sword. While the wound was not fatal, the poison laced on the sword was. What of the assassin? Ali forbade his followers from not only any reprisals but also forbade his followers from mutilating the assassin.
"And do not inflict mutilation on this man, for I heard the Messenger of God say, 'Avoid mutilation, even on a vicious dog.'"
As per Ali's last wishes, Ali's sons set his shrouded corpse on his favourite camel, and "gave it free rein". The camel "knelt some six miles east of Kufa, atop a barren, sandy rise - najaf in Arabic - and there his sons buried the man"

And thus Najaf would come to be the first of the two holy cities in Iraq, where Ali was buried - "revered by all Muslims, but by two very different titles: the first Imam of Shia Islam, and the last of the four rashidun, the Rightly Guided Caliphs of Sunni Islam."

(... to be concluded)

http://www.aftertheprophet.com/
The Accidental Theologist
After the Prophet by Lesley Hazleton « Knopf Doubleday - Doubleday
@accidentaltheo

Kindle Excerpt:



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© 2012, Abhinav Agarwal (अभिनव अग्रवाल). All rights reserved.

Friday, July 27, 2012

After the Prophet, Part 3

Deeply Sympathetic, Gripping Page-Turner. Though At Times Overly Melodramatic Narrative.
(KindleAmazonFlipkartmy review on Amazon)
5 stars

Part 3 - Aisha, Muawiya, and The Night of Shrieking (See Part 1, Part 2)

Even though it had been Aisha, the Prophet's youngest widow, The Mother of the Faithful, who had instigated the crowd against Othman, the Caliph, it was Aisha who was also shocked and infuriated by Othman's assassination, and it was Aisha who marched straight to the the "great mosque", the Kaaba, at Mecca, and roused the people to rise against Ali, with words that were to be echoed by different people in different circumstances, ""Seek revenge for the blood of Othman, and you will strengthen Islam!"" Whether Aisha was more concerned about strengthening Islam or whether more concerned about Ali, her bete-noire, becoming the Calipph, is open to conjecture. However, for the people of Mecca, the argument being made against Ali was the same as what Abu Bakr had used, and the words similar - that Ali's blood was now fair-game, "haraam". Aisha was supported by her brothers-in-law, Talha and Zubayr, who had been part of the six that had voted for Othman after Omar's death, and "each wanted the caliphate for himself". Both Talha and Zubayr would perish the civil war that followed, both done to death, many alleged, by Marwan.

It is useful to include a brief description of Marwan, also known as "Ibn Tarid, the Son of the Exile". His father had been so distrusted by the Prophet that he had been "banished along with his family to the mountain city of Taif." Othman would later reverse this banishment, and recall Marwan to Medina to serve as his chief-of-staff. Furthermore, "no sooner was the battle lost than he rode across the desert to Damascus, to become a senior counselor in the court of Muawiya, the governor of Syria." Muawiya, brother-in-law of Muhammad (his sister, Umm Habiba, had been the Prophet's eighth wife) is another character that belies belief, and more on him later. If ever there was a medieval machinator par-excellence, and without compunctions of any sort, it has to be Muawiya.

Aisha marched from Mecca to Basra, and Ali marched with his army from Medina.
"So when Aisha rode out onto that battlefield outside Basra on her red camel, it was the first time a Muslim woman had led men into war. It was also to be the last."
Actually, this particular bit is not quite true, since Razia Sultan, Sultana of Delhi from 1236 to 1240 CE, led her army in battle against Malik Altunia, her childhood friend and governor of Bhatinda. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Razia_Sultan)

Despite entreaties from several, including Ali, war was not avoided, and the first of what would be an endless elegy of civil wars amongst the Islamic community was fought in October 656CE, less than twenty-five years after the death of the Prophet.
"Hand-to-hand combat was utterly and horribly visceral."
...
"Hardened warriors swore the rest of their lives that they had never seen so many severed arms and legs. It lasted from early morning to midafternoon, and by the time it was done, three thousand men, most of them from Aisha’s army, lay dead and dying."
In the end, the battle was fought around Aisha's camel, with Ali's soldiers appealing to her to surrender, and Aisha sent soldier after soldier to his death. "Seventy men were cut down as they held the reins of Aisha’s camel," and Aisha's own armoured howdah was peppered with so many arrows it "bristled like a porcupine."

As I  read the pasages describing the brutal war, I was reminded again and again about the Mahabharata, and the passages describing the mayhem and severing of limbs that took place in that terrible war.

Aisha was finally defeated, and she returned to Medina, escorted for the first few miles on the journey by Ali and his two grandsons, Hasan and Hussein, as a gesture of respect for the defeated and also to the widow of the Prophet.

Muawiya

Meanwhile, Muawiya, governor of Syria, and "a clear-eyed pragmatist who delighted in the art and science of manipulation, whether by bribery, flattery, intelligence, or exquisitely calculated deception" had watched the outcome of this battle between Aisha and Ali from Damascus. power,  He had let Othman's bloodstained clothes be displayed for a year, to derive maximum mileage from that sight.
"Caliph, Muawiya had ruled Syria for close to twenty years, and the whole province - nearly all the land now known as Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Palestine - had become his own personal fiefdom, a powerhouse in its own right."
While Muawiya lived in a luxurious palace, he had however escaped any resentment from the people, thanks to his exquisite cunning. He "prided himself on being exactly as generous and precisely as ruthless as he needed to be."
"“If there be but one hair binding someone to me, I do not let it break,” he once said. “If he pulls, I loosen; if he loosens, I pull.” As for any sign of dissent: “I do not apply my sword where my whip is enough, nor my whip where my tongue is enough.”
...
As one of his senior generals put it, “Whenever I saw him lean back, cross his legs, blink, and command someone ‘Speak!’ I had pity on that man.”
...
“I do not come between people and their tongues,” he said, “so long as they do not come between us and our rule.""
When Ali recalled all governors appointed by Othman, all but Muawiya complied. Ali rejected sage advice from his advisers, who asked Ali to play the same devious political games as Muawiya. Ali would have "nothing to do with such underhand schemes". His advisers assured Ali that he would not have had to do any of the dirty work required to secure allegiance from Muawiya. His aides would do that for him.
"...one of his top generals had promised. “I swear I will take him to the desert after a watering, and leave him staring at the backside of things whose front side he has no idea of."
Four months later Muawiya replied to Ali's missive with an "openly hostile" letter. Ali's inevitable response was to lead "his battle-tested army north out of Basra to Kufa, a hundred and fifty miles closer to Damascus," This would also lead to Iraq becoming the cradle of Shia Islam. Muawiya, in the meantime, set about manipulating popular opinion in his favor, and this included "a carefully staged campaign to present himself as loath to take action. He would have to be forced into it by the outraged conscience of the people."

And thus it came to war, "Early that summer of 657 the two armies, Syrian and Iraqi, met at the Plain of Siffin just west of the Euphrates, in what is today northern Syria." Ali even went to the extent of challenging Muawiya to a one-to-one duel, and to avoid the inevitable "mass bloodshed". Muawiya refused, even though it was not "fitting for him to refuse such a challenge", with the practical reply that ""Ali has killed everyone he has ever challenged to single combat.""

And so the war began. The Battle of Siffin, as it was called, continued into the second night, which came to be known as the "Night of Shrieking", so called for the "unearthly howls of men in mortal agony, a sound more fortunate people now know only as that of an animal hit by a car, dragging itself to the side of the road to die." Hasan and Hussein, Ali's sons, and the Prophet's grandsons, urged Ali to move faster on the battlefield to avoid being so exposed a target. Ali's famed response was:
""My sons," he said, "the fateful day will inevitably come for your father. Going fast will not make it come later, and going slow will not make it come sooner. It makes no difference to your father whether he comes upon death, or death comes upon him.""
As the battle progressed, it was clear that Ali's armies were gaining the upper hand, and it was a matter of perhaps only hours before the war was won. But Muawiya was not defeated. He had a masterstroke up his sleeve. Parchment copies of the Quran were distributed to the army's top cavalry, "with orders for each horseman to spear a single parchment sheet on the tip of his lance and then ride into the enemy lines."
Unbelievable. But happen it did.

What was worse, for Ali, was that his army refused to fight at the sight of the Quran, and lay down their weapons. Muawiya then proposed arbitration between the two armies, with the holy Quran as the guiding light. This again was a masterstroke. He had "couched his proposal in the most pious terms" to make it acceptable to Ali's army. Ali, on the other hand, saw the Quran being turned into a political tool, and warned his men, ""Do not forget that I forbade you this," ... "This will only demolish strength, destroy right, and bequeath lowliness. Shame on you!""

Thus outmaneuvered, as Ali's army began the march back to Kufa, the murmurs of disappointment began to arise. Rather than confront their own gullibility, some turned an accusatory finger at Ali. The leader of the disgruntled was Abdullah ibn Wahb, and they were to be the "first Islmaic fundamentalists". The name Abdullah ibn Wahb "still reverberates in the Islamic world since it calls to mind Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the fundamentalist Wahhabi sect."

(... to be concluded)
http://www.aftertheprophet.com/
The Accidental Theologist
After the Prophet by Lesley Hazleton « Knopf Doubleday - Doubleday
@accidentaltheo

Kindle Excerpt:



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© 2012, Abhinav Agarwal (अभिनव अग्रवाल). All rights reserved.

Sunday, July 22, 2012

After the Prophet, Part 2

Deeply Sympathetic, Gripping Page-Turner. Though At Times Overly Melodramatic Narrative.
(KindleAmazonFlipkartmy review on Amazon)
5 stars

The Ascent of Ali
(See part 1 of review)

Abu Bakr was the new caliph, but Ali had not acknowledged or publicly pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr. The task of making Ali fall in line fell unfortunately on Omar, unfortunate because while Omar was a courageous military commander, he was ill-suited to the task of diplomacy. The task failed, and failed miserably, as Omar crashed his entire body against the locked door of Ali’s house, slamming into the pregnant Fatima, who gave birth to a stillborn boy a few weeks later. This was followed by a social boycott of Ali and his family, to force them to fall in line. Ali soon thereafter pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr, more for the "sake of unity in the face of rebellion" by "Many of the tribes in the north and center of the vast peninsula".

At this point, pause to ponder how the justification of Muslims killing Muslims begins. Islam proscribes the killing of a fellow Muslim. "That was haram, taboo, in Islam."  However, by declaring anyone who refused to pay the taxes due to Islam an apostate, as argued by Omar, "to shed his blood was no longer taboo. It was now halal - permitted under Islamic law." Notice how political compunctions were already triumphing over the Prophet’s words.

The Wars of Apostasy (the "ridda" wars) wars - "were as ruthless as Abu Bakr had promised." However, Abu Bakr died soon thereafter, of natural causes ("He would be the only Islamic leader to die of natural causes for close on fifty years"), but not before he had "appointed Omar the second Caliph." Yet again, Ali, cheated as some would say of his rightful place as successor, pledged allegiance to Omar, and, as "Omar’s rule began, Ali married Abu Bakr’s youngest widow, Asma."
"every time Omar left Medina on one of his many military campaigns, Ali stood in as his deputy. It was a clear sign, understood by all to mean that when the time came, Ali would succeed Omar as Caliph."
Omar as the caliph actually "discouraged conversion. He wanted to keep Islam pure - that is, Arab". This would be seen as an affront by the Persians, and who "would convert in large numbers after his death." This reluctance on Omar’s part to discourage conversions also had an economic angle.
"Omar had set up the diwan, a system by which every Muslim received an annual stipend, much as citizens of the oil-rich Gulf state of Dubai do today." 
More the number of Muslims, lower would be the share of the stipend in each Muslim’s hands. Ergo the policy towards conversions.

Omar was assassinated by a "Christian slave from Persia" who would "stab the Caliph six times as he bent down for morning prayer in the mosque, then drive the dagger deep into his own chest".
However, on his deathbed, Omar threw a googly on the topic of succession. He "named Ali"and "five others"! These six would be the candidates as well as selectors. One of the six would be elected the new, the third, Caliph.

As fate would have it, two of the people shortlisted from among the six were Ali and Othman.
"On the one hand was Ali, now in his mid-forties, the famed philosopher-warrior who had been the first man to accept Islam and who had served as deputy to both Muhammad and Omar. On the other was Othman, the pious and wealthy Umayyad who had converted early to Islam but had never actually fought in any battle and, at seventy, had already survived far beyond the average life span of the time." 
The other men in the room announced, rather pre-empted Ali by announcing, Othman as the third Caliph, and Ali "pledged allegiance to yet another man as Caliph."

Omar had been assassinated by a Christian slave. Othman too would be assassinated, but by a Muslim, and who, "many would argue that he had excellent cause." The reason? Money. Money corrupts. And Money corrupted.
"Muhammad had wrested control of Mecca from Othman’s Umayyad clan, but with one of their own now in the leadership of Islam, the Umayyads seized the chance to reassert themselves as the aristocracy, men of title and entitlement, and Othman seemed unable - or unwilling - to resist them."
The loudest voice to protest Othman came from Aisha, who called the Caliph a "dotard". She was to do more, but before that, Walid, one of Othman’s half-brothers harboured a not unfamiliar aristocratic disdain for the "residents under his control", and dismissed them as "worth "no more than a goat’s fart in the desert plains of Edom."

When Othman dismissed a delegation of Kufans who had come demanding the recall and public flogging, they went to Aisha for justice. Othman’s "sneer", "Can the rebels and scoundrels of Iraq find no other refuge than the home of Aisha?" was like throwing a gauntlet to the Mother of the Faithful, who, took that up. And take it up she did in style. She stood "brandishing a sandal that had belonged to Muhammad" and shouted at "Othman in that high, piercing voice of hers. .. ‘See how this, the Prophet’s own sandal, has not yet even fallen apart?’ ‘This is how quickly you have forgotten the sunna, his practice!’"
"As the whole mosque erupted in condemnation of the Caliph, people took off their own sandals and brandished them in Aisha’s support." 
History had been created. George Bush, US President, would be at the receiving end of this fourteen hundred years later.

Despite a military standoff between the town of Medina and thee armed columns that had come in response to letters asking for strong action, Othman refused to either resign or sanction strong action against Walid. Othman was stoned unconscious at the mosque at the Friday prayers, an ominous prelude to what lay in store. A secret letter, planted perhaps without the knowledge of the Caliph, ignited the attack on Medina. Othman was killed, by devout Muslims.
"Abu Bakr was the first to strike, the son of the first Caliph leading the assassins of the third. His dagger slashed across the old man’s forehead, and that first blood was the sign that released the others. As Othman fell back, they piled in on him, knives striking again and again. Blood splashed onto the walls, onto the carpet, even onto the open pages of the Quran—an indelible image of defilement that still haunts the Muslim faithful, both Sunni and Shia."
Thus, on June 16th, 656 CE, Ali was crowned "Commander of the Faithful", since he refused to take the title of Caliph.
"Ali was destined to be the only man aside from Muhammad himself whom both Sunnis and Shia would acknowledge as a rightful leader of Islam."
However, the bloodsoaked shirt of Othman and the severed fingers of his wife Naila were "on their way to Damascus", while Aisha remained in Mecca.

http://www.aftertheprophet.com/
The Accidental Theologist
After the Prophet by Lesley Hazleton « Knopf Doubleday - Doubleday
@accidentaltheo

Kindle Excerpt:



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© 2012, Abhinav Agarwal (अभिनव अग्रवाल). All rights reserved.

After the Prophet: The Epic Story of the Shia-Sunni Split in Islam

After the Prophet: The Epic Story of the Shia-Sunni Split in Islam, by Lesley Hazleton


Deeply Sympathetic, Gripping Page-Turner. Though At Times Overly Melodramatic Narrative.
(Kindle, Amazon, Flipkartmy review on Amazon)
5 stars
This is a notable book I read and reviewed. Click to see more such books.

Part 1: The death of the Prophet and the first Caliph (Part 2)
A remarkably lucid, gripping, and evocative account of the origins of the Shia-Sunni split in Islam. The narrative gets overly melodramatic at times, but can be overlooked.

The history of Islam is much more nuanced, and more full of timeless human emotions and failings, and that much more riveting than has been typically caricatured in Western media. Perhaps the need to indulge in simplistic reductionisms has fuelled this black-and-white depictions of entire religions and people. The loss is more than just abstract - the terrible price paid for by the people in the Middle-East and the ghastly costs of Western interventions have been there for all to see.

Among several aspects of Islam, a fundamental one when trying to explain and understand the schisms in the religion, and also the historical underpinnings of a lot of the conflict amongst the nations in the Middle-East, is perhaps the Shia-Sunni divide. This book, short though it is, does a remarkable job of narrating document the origins of the Shia-Sunni split in Islam. It does so in the short space of 250 pages, and is written with much empathy. It seeks to explain, without judging. And that is perhaps a good thing, because there will be ample opportunities for forming opinions; this book should be used to inform.

"What happened at Karbala in the seventh century is the foundation story of the Sunni-Shia split."

But before we can get to Karbala, we have to travel to the place where Muhammad would breathe his last, at the age of sixty-three, most likely from bacterial meningitis. As he lay dying, the question of who would succeed the Prophet was foremost amongst his followers. The closest among Muhammad’s followers was Ali. Ali, not only was "close enough by virtue of being Muhammad’s paternal first cousin and his adoptive son, Muhammad handpicked him to marry Fatima, his eldest daughter" where "the Prophet not only performed the wedding ceremony himself but laid down one condition: the new couple would follow the example of his own marriage to Khadija and be monogamous." Ali and Fatima would give the Prophet "two adored grandsons, Hasan and Hussein." It would Ali "whose name the Shia were to take as their own. They were, and are, the followers of Ali, or in Arabic, Shiat Ali - Shia, for short."

The fact that Muhammad had never clearly and unambiguously designated his successor made things that much more difficult for his followers. That there was a deep-rooted animosity, the result of perhaps a trifling misunderstanding, between his youngest wife, Aisha, and Ali, didn't help either.
"Aisha and Ali, the two people closest of all to Muhammad on a daily basis, had barely been able to speak a civil word to each other for years, even in his presence." 
That the Prophet left behind no son, who could have been seen and accepted by all as his legitimate successor also complicated matters.  "though Muhammad’s first wife, Khadija, had given birth to two sons alongside four daughters, both had died in infancy, and though Muhammad had married nine more wives after her death, not one had become pregnant." As the author writes, "Or as Sunni theologians would argue in centuries to come, perhaps this late-life childlessness was the price of revelation." The closest the Prophet had come to designating Ali his successor was when, in 632 CE, he had raised Ali’s "hand high in his own" and said, "of whom I am the master, of him Ali is also the master," ". But never did Muhammad clearly designate Ali, or anyone else, as his formal successor. Maybe he knew the fate that awaited his successors, for on his deathbed, the Prophet,
"with his dying breath, repeat his chilling last words three times: "Oh God, have pity on those who will succeed me.""
Apart from Ali, then, there were Abu Bakr and Omar, who were the Prophet’s in-laws, who were claimants to the Prophet’s legacy, his "khalifa"

The origins of the standoff between Aisha and Ali could be traced to a scandal referred to as "The Affair of the Necklace". Aisha, the Prophet’s youngest wife, had lost a necklace near Medina when returning from an expedition with the Prophet and hundreds of his followes. The necklace had been a gift from the Prophet. In her haste to search and retrieve the necklace, she had not informed the caravan, nor had the caravan noticed her absence, and had proceeded to Medina without her. No one from the caravan came to fetch her, and it was a Medinan named Safwan who "helped her up onto his camel, then led the animal on foot the whole twenty miles to Medina." Unfortunately, unsurprisingly, tongues started wagging in the valley of Medina, and when Muhammad turned to Ali for advice, he got a "peculiarly curt" response,
""There are many women like her," he said. "God has freed you from constraints. She is easily replaced.""
 Now, can you blame Aisha for harbouring a lifelong animosity against Ali? Anyway, to complete the story, Muhammad went into a "prophetic trance" while at Abu Bakr, Aisha’s father’s, house, and uttered words that are "now part of Sura 24 of the Quran", where it was ordained that people slandering a woman would need to produce four witnesses for corroboration.
"Unless there were four witnesses to an illegal sexual act, it said, the accused was blameless, and the false accusers were the ones to be punished. For a wronged woman, there could have been no better outcome, yet the form of it would be cruelly turned around and used by conservative clerics in centuries to come to do the opposite of what Muhammad had originally intended: not to exonerate a woman but to blame her. The wording of his revelation would apply not only when adultery was suspected but also when there had been an accusation of rape. Unless a woman could produce four witnesses to her rape—a virtual impossibility—she would be considered guilty of slander and adultery, and punished accordingly."
There was one more chapter in this particular episode, the twisted consequences of which Islamic women wear to this day.
"The sight of her riding into Medina on Safwan’s camel had branded itself into the collective memory of the oasis, and that was the last thing Muhammad needed. In due course, another Quranic revelation dictated that from now on, his wives were to be protected by a thin muslin curtain from the prying eyes of any men not their kin. And since curtains could work only indoors, they would soon shrink into a kind of minicurtain for outdoors: the veil.

The Revelation of the Curtain clearly applied only to the Prophet’s wives, but this in itself gave the veil high status. Over the next few decades it would be adopted by women of the new Islamic aristocracy—and would eventually be enforced by Islamic fundamentalists convinced that it should apply to all women."
Upon the Prophet’s death, by "noon of that Monday, June 8 in the year 632", started the task of selecting, perhaps electing, his successor. Whether he would come from the Hashimis or the Ummayads in the Quraysh tribe was a thorny one. A "shura", "a traditional intertribal forum", was called for, which was gate-crashed by Abu Bakr and Omar. After more than twenty-four of debates and speeches, when all were at the point of exhaustion, Abu Bakr and Omar made their "closing move", with Abu Bakr proposing Omar as the "new leader of Islam", Omar in turn proposing Othman’s name (an aristocrat from the Umayyad tribe), and Omar, after there had been a fist-fight in which Ibn Obada, the convener of the shura, was beaten unconscious, Omar proposed Abu Bakr as the caliphate. Abu Bakr, the father of the Prophet’s youngest wife, Aisha, a strong-willed and headstrong woman.

Ali was not present at this shura. His "years of dust and thorns" were about to begin.













http://www.aftertheprophet.com/
The Accidental Theologist
After the Prophet by Lesley Hazleton « Knopf Doubleday - Doubleday
@accidentaltheo



Kindle Excerpt:

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© 2012, Abhinav Agarwal (अभिनव अग्रवाल). All rights reserved.

Saturday, November 26, 2005

Taj Mahal, Agra

The Taj Mahal in Agra. Vehicular traffic to the Taj has been stopped. You can only go on foot, or use a non-polluting vehicle. CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) vehicles are allowed. This would include buses and auto-rickshaws fitted with CNG kits. As you can see in this photo, these are mightily rickety contraptions that don't inspire much confidence.


Outside the Taj complex are arrays of shops that try to sell you everything from miniature Taj Mahal replicas, cold drinks, bangles, and almost everything else under the sun. They also make it a point to remind you that eatables and beverages are no longer allowed inside the Taj complex, so it's best to quench your thirst here.


The ticket counter. The fees is about ten rupees per person for Indians, and Rs 750. Yes, you got that right. Wonder what happened to the 'atithi devo bhava' stuff. I suspect it's been replaced by 'sabse bada rupaiya'.


After you purchase a ticket you have to get past the security check, where they check and frisk and run a metal detector over you to make sure you are not carring any bombs or eatables. Yes, both are considered unacceptable inside the Taj.


This is the south gate to the Taj (or maybe it's the west gate, I am not sure).


As you approach this gate, you start to get the first glimpse of the Taj. It's dome and a couple of minarets become visible.


As you walk through the gate, you get your first full view of the Taj. Impressive, to say the least.


So this is how the Taj looks like from the entrance. At the left and right are mosques.


Ok, so if you get closer to the Taj, it still looks as white and beautiful and, uh, crowded. Even on a sweltering day with the mercury topping 35C there are hundreds and hundreds of people to be seen.


The compound is so huge, and the Taj so huge, that you can still get a shot that makes it appear that there aren't that many people around. Thank goodness for that.


There are huge gardens on either side of the central walkway to the Taj.


This is the view from the base of the Taj. If you climb up you get to the platform.


These are the stairs to the platform. One special thing to note about these stairs is that each step is made of a single marble stone. And the steps themselves are a good 10 inches high, sloping downwards slightly, which makes walking down a trickery process.


Once on the platform, if you look to the left, which I believe would be the north, you can see the Yamuna river flow. In the background, and a few kilometers away, is the Agra Fort.


The calligraphic inscriptions are from the Kuran, and is a fine example of inlay work. Which means that there is no painting here. The black text has been embedded within the marble. Run your fingers over the text and you can scarcely make out the transition from marble to text. What's also special about this text is that it increases in size the higher it goes, so that the entire text looks the same size when viewed from the bottom.


The Taj as viewed from the side of the Taj Mosque.


This is the Taj Mosque, built on the western side of the Taj Mahal. It is an exact replica of the strucure on the eastern side, called the Jama'at Khana (or Mehman Khana).


This is the Taj as seen from the Taj Mosque. In case you haven't figured it out, the Taj is symmetrically built, which means that it looks the same no matter from which side you view it. Try it sometime.


This is the plaque that describes the Taj Mosque and Jam'at Khana.


Finally, this is one of two plaques describing the Taj. The other plaque is in English.


This is the plaque in English.


Ok, so if you do not like to travel the short distance to the Taj in the rickety contraption I photographed, you have the option of getting a camel ride!


Lastly, this is another photo of the Taj from the Taj Mosque side.\


© 2005, Abhinav Agarwal (अभिनव अग्रवाल). All rights reserved. Reposted to this blog, July 2013.